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U.S. banks' total LDC loan exposure and exposure
relative to assets and capital have declined since theLDC
debt crisis began in 1982. The authorsfind, however, that
exposure to troubled LDCs has not fallen as much as
exposure to more creditworthy borrowers, and that
exposure has become increasingly concentrated at the
largest U.S. banks. They posit three possible explana-
tions: involuntary lending, banks' relative advantages in
working with troubled borrowers, and the existence of
deposit insurance, which distorts lending decisions.
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In February 1987, the government of Brazil announced
that it was suspending interest payments on its debts to
commercial banks. This debt-service moratorium came as
no surprise to the international financial community since
Brazil's ability to meet the regularly scheduled payments
of principal and interest on its obligations had been
deteriorating for some time. Nonetheless, Brazil's action
underscored the lingering concerns about a number of
lesser developed country (LDC) debtors following the
1982 debt crisis.
In viewof renewed worries about the economichealth of
LDC debtors and the continued high level of exposure to
those borrowers within the U.S. banking industry, a num-
ber of U.S. banks took action to increase their loan loss
reserves in June 1987. All told, these additions to loan loss
reserves amounted to over $15 billion. Bank stock values
responded favorably,but questions remain concerning the
adequacy of these actions.
Moreover, bank regulators remain concerned about
U.S. banks' exposure to developing countries. For exam-
ple, as part of its risk-based capital proposal announced in
July 1987, the Federal Reserve Board suggested that all
banks with large exposures to high-risk countries be
required to maintain capital positions above the minimum
ratios.
This paper examines U.S. banks' exposure to interna-
tional borrowers, with a particular emphasis on the subset
of troubled LDCs. It attempts to explain the pattern of
exposure that apparently concentrates international lend-
ing risk in the banking system. The paper is organized in
the following way. In the first and second sections, we
describe the events leading up to the debt crisis that
erupted in August 1982, when Mexico announced a mor-
atorium on debt service, and how the debt crisis affected
bank lending to developing countries.
Readers who are familiar with this background material
maywish to tum directly to the third section where we take
a closer look at U.S. banks' exposure to developing
countries since the debt crisis. We find a number of
surprising and possibly disturbing developments, includ-
ing an increase in U.S. banks' exposure to troubled LDCs
relative to their exposures to other international borrowers
and an increasing concentration of that total exposure at
the largest U.S. banks. In the fourth section, we attempt to
explain these developments. The paper concludes with a
discussion of policy implications.
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Prior to the 1970s, longer term lending to developing
countries occurredprimarily through official sources. The
bulk of private capital flows, to the extentthey occurred,
took the form of foreign direct investment. Private lenders
such as commercial banks tended to provide funds pri-
marily to finance trade.
Even before the first oil crisis in 1973-74, however,the
role of private lenders began to change dramatically. Some
have suggested that the rapid rise in the U.S. money
supply in the early 1970s and the adoption of floating
exchange rates increased liquidity, particularly in the form
of Eurodollars, and led to a rise in international lending by
commercial banks. The first oil shock then generated
current account deficits for oil-importing countries and
equally large surpluses in the current accounts of the
Persian Gulf countries. Private lenders, most notably
commercial banks, facilitated the flow of funds between
lending and borrowing countries.
Chart 1shows the growth in the external indebtedness of
Latin American countries to all countries from 1970
through 1984. It is clear that private lenders' (primarily
banks) share of the total funds advanced to those countries
increased significantly. Moreover, data on bank lending
suggests that U.S. banks took an active role in supplying
credit to LDCs generally, with exposure reaching apeak of
$166.2 billion in 1983.
Although severaldeveloping countriesexperienceddebt
service problems during this period, in general, the high
inflation of the middle and late 1970s guaranteed that the
real, or inflation-adjusted, debt service burden was quite
low because loans were repaid in devalued dollars. More-
over, rapid growth of the economies of the industrial
countries generated strong demand for the exports of
developing countries. Consequently, very fewLDCs expe-
rienced payment difficulties despite the rapid growth in the
nominal value of their indebtedness.
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of factors
combined to increase LDC debtors' real debt burdens.
First, real interest rates rose dramatically as central banks
moved to reduce inflation by tightening credit. The rise in
real interest rates was translated immediately to LDCs'
borrowing costs since most of LDCs' debt was short- or
medium-term at floating rates tied to a market rate, such as
LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate). Second, in 1982,
worldwide inflation unexpectedly abated. Long-term debt
obligations that were contracted on the assumption that
export prices would continue rising suddenly became
more costly in real terms. Worse yet, the decline in
inflation was not translated into lower nominal interest
rates.
Moreover, the value of the dollar, the currency in which
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ISLDC currencies, making it more expensive for developing
countries to earn dollars with which to service their debts.
Ordinarily, the rise in the value of the dollar would have
stimulated demand for developing countries' exports,
enabling them to generate additional foreign exchange.
Instead, a worldwide recession reduced the demand for
developing countries' exports and made it extraordinarily
expensive for LDCs to obtain foreign exchange to service
their debt obligations.
These developments culminated in Mexico's announce-
ment in August 1982that it wasimposing a moratoriumon
the payment of interest on itsdebt obligations. Apayments
"crisis" ensued. Mexico's creditors were able to negotiate
a "restructuring" of Mexico's debt to alleviate near-term
debt service problems, but by then a number of other
LDCs were experiencing similar difficulties.
At this point, default on LDC loans and the potential for
collapse ofthe international financial system became areal
concern. Official policymakers and private lenders
adopted similar approaches to managing the crisis for all
debtors experiencing difficulties. First, to obtain short-
term financing from the IMF (International Monetary
Fund), the debtor country had to reach an agreement with
the IMF concerning an economic reform program
designed to improve the longer term outlook for its debt
service capacity. Second, once an IMF agreement was
reached, banks had to reach an agreement with the debtor
to reschedule their loans. Initially, these reschedulings
established higher fees and spreads over the cost of funds
to compensate banks for lengthening loan maturities. In
subsequent reschedulings, spreads and fees were reduced
even as loan maturities were extended. (Actually, funds
provided by the IMF also were conditioned upon the
country reaching an agreement with its bank creditors.)
Finally, in a number of cases, banks also provided addi-
tional new funds at reduced interest rates primarily to
enable countries to cover their contractual interest pay-
ments. Typically, banks participated in these new loans in
proportion to their outstandingexposures to the borrower. 1
H. Bank Lending and Changing Risk Perceptions
As the crisis unfolded, investors abruptly changed their
assessment of the probability of default on LDC debt
obligations. This sort of change in perceived default prob-
abilities can be inferred from the sharp decrease in the
value of outstanding claims on LDCs. The behavior of
prices in the bond, bank loan, and, indirectly, the bank
equities market is consistent with this view.
Articles by Edwards (1986), Folkerts-Landau (1985)
and Dornbusch (1986) examine the internationalbond and
bank loan markets' reactions to Mexico's announcement.
These articles compare yields on international and foreign
bonds issued by individual developing countries with
those issued by industrial countries. They find that the
yield spread increased dramatically in the third quarter of
1982, suggesting that investors required substantially
higher default risk premia for LDC debt than previously. It
is interesting to note, moreover, that default risk premia
increased for all the major non-OPEC LDC debtors,
suggesting an across-the-board reassessment of default
probabilities with respect to LDC debt. Edwards also finds
that the international bond market only anticipated the
debt crisis by a few weeks, and then only partially.
In addition to the evidence from the international bond
market, these articles find that risk premia on bank loans to
LDCs rose during the early 1980s, as well. Terrell (1984),
for example, notes that spreads over LIBOR for selected
major LDCs increased from an average of 125 basis points
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through the first seven months of 1982 to 217 basis points
during 1983.
Additional evidence for the change in perceived default
risk is available from the secondary market for bank loans
to LDCs. This market has existed for some time but
became more prominent after the onset of the debt crisis.
For example, the financial press noted the emergence of
secondary market discounts of 10 to 25 percent relative to
the face value of LDC loans in 1983. 2 (Secondary market
discounts of 50 percent or more are not uncommon for
loans to certain LDCs today.) Since the trading volume in
this market was(and still is) quite thin, prices maynot give
an accurate indication of the level of default risk, but the
change in those prices provides at least some indication
that investors' assessment of default risk changed for the
worse.3
Other studies have focused on the stock market's reac-
tion to the debt crisis. In general, these studies conclude
that investors tended to discount the market values of
banks that had large exposures to developing country debt.
Beebe (1985), for example, found that between 1982 and
the end of 1984, the sharp downward valuation of the
equities of the largest bank holding companies (those with
assets over $10 billion) can be explained in part by their
individual exposures to Latin American debtors, specifi-
cally Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Kyle and
Sachs (1984) likewise findevidencethat the market tended
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exposures to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Vene-
zuela between September 1982 and June 1983. 4
Given the strong evidence for an increase in perceived
default risk following Mexico's actions, one would expect
to see a sharp decrease in the supply of loans to LDCs.
While it may be difficult to attribute patterns in LDC
lending to supply versus demand factors, the observed
decline in new lending is at least consistent with the view
that lenders became less willing to extend credit after the
debt crisis. According to data published by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), new medium- and long-term bank lending to
LDCs dropped from an average of $39.2 billion a year in
the period between 1978 and 1982 to $24. 1 billion after
1982. 5
Moreover, only a relatively small proportion of the
"new" lending to LDCs after the crisis actually represents
a net increase in the amountof borrowed funds available to
those countries. Instead, most of the new lending reported
by the OECD involves rollovers of maturing obligations
and/or reschedulings. Net new funds typically have been
provided only to enable the borrower to meet interest
payments coming due on outstanding obligations. In addi-
tion, most of the lending (whetheron a net or a gross basis)
has been considered "involuntary" in the sense that it
takes place at below-marketclearingrates and commercial
bank lending syndicates have had to invoke "fair-share"
rules with varying degrees of success as a means of
inducing members to continue to provide funds.
In fact, because commercial bank lending to LDCs
dropped off so dramatically, in October 1985, Treasury
Secretary Baker announced the so-calledBakerPlan. The
Plan established modest goals for concerted net new
lending by commercial banks in conjunction with
increased official lending to the fifteen principal LDC
debtors. (For a list of the "Baker Fifteen," see Appendix
A.) Nonetheless, net new lending to these countries has
been meager at best. In 1986, loans outstanding actually
declined by nearly $3 billion."
III. Effect on U.S. Bank Portfolios
The increase in the perceived probability of default on
LDC loans lowered the value of the loans outstanding to
LDCs. As a result, U.S. banks suffered market value
capital losses even though they generally did not re-value
LDC loans on their books, or increase their loan loss
reserves significantly until the spring of 1987. Based on
data compiled from a variety of sources, U.S. banks
apparently wrote down only $2.2 billion, or approx-
imately 1.7 percent, of their loans to non-OPEC LDCs
between 1982 and 1985.7 Moreover, total provisions to
increase loan loss reserves likewise were modest, averag-
ing approximately 0.51 percent of assets per year during
this period.8
However, U.S. banks did take other steps to counter the
effects of the decline in the market values of their port-
folios. For example, banks raised additional capital
through increased retained earnings, asset sales, and sales
of new equity and subordinated debt. They also curtailed
asset growth overall, and LDC loan growth particularly.
Terrell (1984) notes, for example, that banks raised front-
end fees on LDC loans as a means of curtailing lending.
Outstanding loans to LDCs fell from a total of $152.6
billion in 1981 to $133.6 billion at the end of 1986. As a
result of these actions, exposure to LDC debtors steadily
fell between 1982 and 1986.
Charts 2 and 3 show the marked change in U.S. banks'
LDC debt exposure, in relation both to total assets and
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bookvalue capital for those banks with significant interna-
tional lending exposure." In the years preceding the debt
crisis, both total assets and book capital grew at roughly
the same annual rate (11.9 and 11.6 percent, respectively),
while loans to LDCs grew at a faster rate (14.9 percent, on
an annual basis). As a result, both measures of LDC loan
exposure rose between 1977 and 1982, the former reach-
ing more than 13 percent of assets and the latter more than
243 percent of capital. Then, beginning in 1982, exposure
relative to capital, in particular, declined. By 1986, it was
about half the level of 1981.
Mostof this decline is the result of banks' efforts to raise
book capital. Between 1982 and 1986, banks increased
capital at a 13.2 percent annual rate, while LDC loans
outstanding declined at only a 5.0 percent annual rate.
Mostoftheseloans originally were short-term, and banks,
in theory, could have chosen not to refinance them upon
maturity. In practice, once the credit had been extended,
banks apparently were unable to force repayment of
principal.
Moreover, closer examination of the patterns of
exposure - among LDCs and other international bor-
rowers, as well as exposure by size of bank - yields some
interesting and possibly disturbing observations. First,
exposure to all nations excluding LDCs, declined more
rapidly than total LDC exposure. For example, U.S.
banks' exposure to the majorindustrial nations, that is, the
17G-lO countries plus Switzerland, declined 57.3 percent
from 210 percent of capital in 1981 to 90 percent in 1986.
Total international loan exposure relative to capital
declined by 55.2 percent. In contrast, LDC loan exposure
declined by 52.7 percent. Thus, the decline in LDC loan
exposure is not nearly as dramatic when one considers the
decline in lending to other, more creditworthy interna-
tional borrowers.
Second, within the category of LDC borrowers, the
decline in U.S. bank exposure has varied, with more
dramatic declines reported for the LDCs that are not
experiencingdebt problems. Toanalyze this development,
we grouped LDCs into two categories - "troubled" and
"not troubled". The troubled borrowers were selected
according to the following criteria: they received a rating
of worse than average by Institutional Investor, and/or
their outstanding bank loans were trading at a discount of
more than ten percent of face value in the secondary
market. Furthermore, in most cases, troubled countries
have a recent history of balance of payments difficulties,
economic instability, and actual defaults on their obliga-
tions. (Appendix A contains a list of the countries that fall
into the troubled category, as well as a list of the "Baker
Fifteen" countries.)
One wayof measuring the change in banks' exposure to
these two groups that attempts to control for the common
factors that may have caused a general decline in interna-
tional lending is to examine the changein these borrowers'
shares of U.S. banks' international loan portfolios. Thus,
Table 1 shows that exposure to what we have termed
troubled LDCs has risen from 26.1 percent of banks'
international loan portfolios in 1982 to 29.4 percent in
1986. Moreover, exposure to the Baker Fifteen has risen
from 25.9 to 31.3 percent of banks' international loan
portfolios. At the same time, loans to industrialized coun-
tries have fallen from 39.7 percent to 37.7 percent, and
loans to nontroubled LDCs have fallen from 12.0 percent
to 11.5 percent.
Thus, although borrowing by troubled LDCs has
declined in absolute terms, borrowing by more creditwor-
borrowers has declined by more. As a result, banks'
relative exposure to troubled LDCs has risen. By implica-
tion, banks have tended to keep the worst risks in their
portfolios. Consequently, the decline in total LDC
exposure observed in Charts 2 and 3 overstates the decline
in U.S. banks' exposure to default risk associated with
lending to LDCs.
A third observation is that exposure by size of bank also
has varied, with the nine largest banks holding a larger
percentage of troubled LDC loans now than in 1981. As a
percentage of total loans outstanding to troubled bor-
rowers, the nine money center banks reporting on the
Chart 2
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CELS now hold 63 percent compared to a low of 56
percent in 1982. Table 2 shows that, in contrast, the other
two groups of banks - the next 14 largest and all other
international lenders - systematically reduced their pro-
portional shares of the total U.S. bank exposure to trou-
bled LDCs. Toa certain extent, this reduction represented
a shift toward more creditworthy borrowers and a general
tendency to reduce international lending altogether.
In terms of absolute changes in exposure, the nine
money center banks reduced their troubled LDC loans
outstanding by only $1 billion, while the next 14 largest
banks and all other banks reduced theirs by $4 billion and
$6 billion, respectively, from 1982-1986. The latter two
groups tended to be more active sellers of loans in the
secondary markets. Also, the non-money center banks'
participation in involuntary new lending arrangements
associated with debt reschedulings has been relatively
limited. For example, Fortune Magazine reported in July
1983 that many of the nine largest banks provided more
than their proportional shares of the rescheduled loans to
Brazil because the other lenders, including many in the
next-largest category, provided substantially less than
their original shares. 10
IV. Explanations
Many observers now suggest that involuntary lending
provides an explanation for these patterns in U.S. banks'
exposure to LDCs. As noted earlier, LDC borrowers were
able to meet debt service obligations through additional
borrowing prior to the crisis. However, withthe decline in
the market's perception of these borrowers' creditworthi-
ness, new funds became scarce.
To induce existing lenders to provide some relief, a
number of debtors threatened to default. Lenders with
outstanding claims against these borrowers, then, were
faced with the choice of forbearing and/or rescheduling
those claims, selling the claims at a discount to other
20
creditors, or declaring the borrowers in default and
attempting to recover value through whatever remedies
might be available. The sale of such claims at a discount
would have involvedthe recognition of accounting losses,
and declaration of default probably would have entailed
even greater losses since the value of collateral generally
was less than the discounted value of the claim. Lenders
therefore may havebeen reluctant to pursue either of these
two options, particularly when the exposure to a given
borrower was large relative to the lender's capital. Conse-
quently, lenders - particularly the largest ones with the
largest exposures and thus the most to lose in the event of
Economic Review / Spring 1988default- may have"chosen" toreschedule existing loans
andeven to extend new loans to cover interest payments on
existing obligations to avoid losses associated with
default.
However, because all existing lenders, whether they
participated or not, would have benefitted from the exten-
sion of new credit, LDC lending syndicates had to invoke
fair-share rules to ensure that adequate additional funds
were provided to prevent default. Nonetheless, lenders
with •relatively small outstanding exposures had little
incentive to participate in such lending. This may explain
the difference in the patterns of exposure among the three
size categories of U.S. banks. 11
While the involuntary lending explanation is consistent
with the patterns we have observed for banks, it is not
entirely satisfactory. A number of troubled LDCs also had
bonds outstanding prior to the crisis. In the absence of
distortions, one would expect, on the basis of the involun-
tary lending explanation, the two groups of lenders - the
bondholders and the banks - to respond similarly to the
debt crisis. Yet the two appear to have responded quite
differently.
Nearly all accounts of the managementof the debt crisis
suggest that it was the bank lenders and not the bond-
holders that were involved in debt reschedulings and
extensionsof new credit. Moreover, data on funds raised in
international capital markets also suggestthat unlike bank
loans, bond financing, at least for certain countries,
became nonexistent after the crisis.
This implies, in other words, that reliance on bank loans
increased relative to bonds as the credit rating of the
borrower declined. Moreover, nonbank creditors appar-
ently became even more reluctant to supply funds to a
borrower with a given low credit rating after the crisis than
before.
To show the difference in the way bank lenders and
bondholders behaved, we regressed the ratio of bank loans
to total external funds raised (including bonded debt) in
international capital markets by a given country in a given
year on the credit rating of that country for that year.
Clearly, because of the way this ratio is defined, an
increase implies that reliance on bonded debt has
decreased. Bank loans were defined as the sum of interna-
tional bank loans and foreign bank loans, but not floating
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 21rate notes held by banks. For the credit rating, we used the
country ratings published annually by Institutional Inves-
tor as a proxy for creditworthiness. Ideally, some sort of
market measure like the actual market prices of loans
would be appropriate. However, the secondary market for
bank loans is thin and quotes prices for only a handful of
countries. A test of the extent to which the Institutional
Investor ratings are a good instrument for the secondary
marketdiscounts revealed that at least for the fewcountries
for which discounts are quoted, the ratings are indeed a
good proxy.12
Totest fora change in LDCs' access to nonbank sources
of funds after the crisis (and controlling for changes in
creditworthiness), we included a dummy variable that
takes the value of zero prior to 1982 and the value of each
country's credit rating afterwards.
We used data compiled by the OECD for a sample of
approximately 62 countries between 1980 and 1986. 13
These countries represent the major international bor-
rowers during this period and include 23 industrial coun-
tries, as well as 10 OPEC, 24 non-OPEC LDCs, and 5
Eastern Bloc countries. Table 3 presents the OECD data
grouped by type of borrower.
The results of our pooled cross-section time-series
regression are summarized in Table 4. The negative and
statistically significant coefficient on the credit rating
22
suggests that as LDCs' creditworthiness deteriorated,
bond financing "dried up" and they were forced to rely
increasingly on bankloans as a source of funds. Moreover,
the negative and significant coefficient on the credit rating
dummy variable suggests that for a given level of credit-
worthiness, access to alternative sources of funds dimin-
ished after the crisis.
These findings are consistentwith the view that after the
debt crisis, a number of LDC borrowers were unable to
obtain funds from other sources and that it was the banks
that were "forced" to renew and reschedule existing loans
to avoid defaults and to protect their investments.
would explain the small decline in banks' exposure to
troubled borrowers relative to the decline in exposure to
more creditworthy borrowers.
Given that the banks appear to have responded dif-
ferently to the debt crisis than did the bondholders, the
question remains as to why. The involuntary lending
explanation does not adequately address this issue.
Assuming that neither the bankers nor the bondholders
were willing to "throw good money after bad," bankers
must have had some inducements to continue lending that
bondholders did not have. Two explanations come to
mind. First, bankers may havehad superiorinformationon
the ability ofLDC debtors to repay,and/or superior ability
to obtain repayment. Second, bank lenders may have had
regulatory incentives to lend that were not available to
bondholders.
In the analysis that follows, these two alternatives are
examined as two different (but not necessarily mutually
exclusive) factors that may haveplayed a significantrole in
determining banks' willingness to lend to LDCs both
before and after the crisis. 14 The first one, the "efficiency
factor," has to do with advantages banks may have relative
to bondholders in assessing and monitoring riskier credits
and in handling problem loan workout situations. The
second factor, the "subsidy factor," relates to the effects
government subsidies (implicit or explicit) may have had
on banks' and investors' portfolio decisions.
Efficiency Factor
One factor that may account for the increase in banks'
exposure to LDCs throughout the 1970s, and, therefore,
may have had a bearing on banks' response to the debt
crisis is what we have termed the efficiency factor. This
explanation focuses on banks' relative advantages as
agents for investors in assessing the creditworthiness of
borrowers, monitoring borrowers, and working through
repayment problems. It draws on insights from models of
principal/agent problems in lending. 15
Broadly speaking, borrowers and investors (that is, the
ultimate lenders) may use two types of financial instru-
Economic Review / Spring 1988rnents to transfer savings. These can be characterized as
bonds (direct finance) on the one hand, and bank loans
(intermediated finance) on the other. The choice between
the two will depend on the one that provides borrowers
with the cheapest source of funds and investors with the
highest return net of the costs associated with administer-
ing their investment. Among the usual costs associated
with administering an investment are the costs of collect-
ing and maintaining records of scheduled principal and
interestpayments, but they also include the cost of more or
lesscontinuously monitoring the borrower's financial con-
dition. This sort of monitoring is necessary to prevent
borrowers from engaging in activities that reduce the value
of the lenders' claims.
For some borrowers, the costs of such monitoring are
relatively modest since publicly available information
conveys an accurate picture of their true net worth and,
therefore, the likelihood of default. Since investors can
readily determine when action is needed to protect the
valueof their claims, these borrowers generally will prefer
bond finance because the standard covenants contained in
bond indentures will provide adequate protection for
investors at the lowest cost. 16. 17
Forother borrowers, however,monitoring maybecostly
because their assets are not traded and are therefore
difficult to evaluate. In these cases, the standard financial
ratios on which bond covenants rely will not convey
accurate information about the borrower's true condition.
In fact, ifthese borrowers were to use bond finance, it is
possible that they might violate standard bond covenants
and therefore be forced to seek new sources of credit or
even be forced into liquidation, even though better infor-
mation would have indicated that such actions were
unnecessary and costly to both borrower and investor.
These borrowers therefore will prefer bank loans
because banks typically have access to information about
their condition that is not readily available to investors
directly. For example, banks mayhave informationabout a
borrower's payments activity and transactions balances
that investors do not. Consequently, banks will be able to
monitor the condition of these borrowers more cheaply
than could the individual investors, making bank loans the
cheaper source of funds. In a sense, then, the obligations
of these borrowers could be worth more to investors when
held in bank portfolios.
This analysis is applicable to international lending,
although solvency may not always be the proper measure
of default risk. Instead, a more general approach would be
to treat default risk as a function of the cost of default. In
cases where actual insolvency is not at issue, default risk
would be defined as the value of unrestricted future access
to external borrowed funds plus the value of seizable
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
assets, to the extent such assets exist. 18 Thus, a sovereign
borrower will not default as long as the cost of doing so
exceeds the value of its external obligations.
Assuming investors can readily determine the value of a
given borrower's external obligations relative to the cost of
defaulting onthose obligations, bonds will be thepreferred
financing vehicle. Presumably, most industrialcountries as
well as those LDCs with relatively small amounts of debt
outstanding, significant wealth, and high returns to capital
investment will be the countries that can tap the bond
markets.
In contrast, LDCs that have high amounts of debt
outstanding relative to GNP or other measures of capacity,
or haveunstable politicalregimes such that default through
repudiation is a possibility, have found their ability to raise
external funds through bond finance severely limited, and
thus have had to rely chiefly on bank loans. To the extent
that investors are willing to hold these obligations at all,
theyappear to prefer to hold them indirectly because banks
can monitor and work with problem borrowers more
cheaply, and because banks have better access to assets
that may be seized than do individual investors.
Banks' apparent advantage in providing credit to higher
risk borrowers suggests that, given the increase in demand
for external funds on the part of LDCs in the 1970s, banks
would have been the logical ones to supply most of the
needed funds. Moreover, this analysis suggests that once
the debt crisis erupted and investors became less certain of
the chances of being repaid, the value of banks' ability to
gauge solvency risk and to handle workout situations
would have increased. Therefore, one would expect to see
banks holding proportionately more of troubled LDCs'
debt than before the crisis. One might also expect the
banks' share of the outstanding obligations of nontroubled
borrowers to fall as the debt crisis changed the relative
values of these obligations as well.
This theory is.consistent with the results of our regres-
sion findings that banks and not bondholders were
involved in continued lending to troubled LDCs. More-
over,it helps toexplain why banks continued to lend to the
smaller borrowers even though, according to the involun-
tary lending explanation, there may have been less incen-
tive to do so because exposure to these borrowers was
small. A recent study by Gluck (1987) supports this view.
He found that as the creditworthiness of selected LDCs
improved in the years afterthe debt crisis, they wereable to
obtain bond financing and forego bank loans asa source of
funds.
Folkerts-Landau (1985) and Edwards (1986) also
provide some interesting evidence that is consistent with
the relative advantage argument. They suggest that
because banks are in a better position to reschedule and
23renegotiate a borrower's obligations than are bondholders,
whose primary recourse is declaring default on the obliga-
tion, risk premia on the two types of instruments should
reflect these differences. Consistent with this hypothesis,
they observe that default risk premia rose by substantially
more on bonds than on bank loans after the onset of the
debt crisis.
The relative advantage argument, then, suggests that
once the debt crisis erupted and investors became more
concerned about the probability of default on the part of at
least some of the LDC debtors, one would expect to see an
even greater preference forbank loans asopposedto bonds
in those countries. As default risk increased, banks' supe-
rior ability to work with troubled debtors and ultimately, to
seize assets, would have become more valuable to inves-
tors. This would explain why U.S. banks' exposure to
troubled LDCs rose relative to their exposure to more
creditworthy international borrowers. It also would
explain why exposure became more concentrated at the
nine largest banks. Since those banks are the ones most
actively involved in the international payments network
and in trade finance, they are also the banks best able to
monitor and seize assets if necessary.
Moreover, in workout situations, lenders need to act
cohesively and the fewer lenders there are, the easier it
would be to achieve consensus. This view suggests first
that bond finance is particularly unsuited to workout
situations since it is unlikely that the myriad bondholders
could be forcedto workcohesively. It also suggests that the
banks with the largest exposures to begin with (that is, the
nine money center banks) would have had the greatest
incentive to workcohesively and tocontinuelending to the
troubled debtors.
Subsidy Factor
A second and possibly more important factor that may
have induced banks to continue lending to troubled LDCs
is the existence of regulatory incentives or subsidies. In
general, government subsidies, either of the lender's
assets or its liabilities, will distort decisions regarding
risk. If the government were to underwrite at least a
portion of the increased risk, lenders would have an
incentive to make and hold riskier loans than they other-
wise would.
These subsidies can arise in two ways. First, the govern-
ment (or a multilateral official institution such as the IMF)
may subsidize exposure to LDCs directly by providing a
guarantee of the loans to LDCs. With a guarantee of this
sort, the guarantor would repay the lender up to the face
value of the guarantee in the event of default by the LDC
debtor. Clearly, such guarantees will encourage banks to
make and hold LDC debt because some or all of the
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increased risk is borne by the guarantor (that is, the
government) and not the lender.
Of course, there have been no public pronouncements
that provide unequivocal evidence ofthe existence of such
guarantees. Sachs (1987), however, maintains that loan
guarantees were an explicit part of the negotiations involv-
ing rescheduled debt. 19 Moreover, a number of other
studies have argued that bank managers and investors
behaved as if implicit guarantees existed, in part because
there are clear public policy goals served by lending to
LDCs. For example, Folkerts-Landau (1985) argues that
the governments of the major industrial countries infor-
mally encouraged banks to lend todeveloping countries on
the implicit understanding that the central banks would
fulfill a lender-of-last-resort function if necessary.20 Like-
wise, Guttentag and Herring (1985) suggest that one
reason that banks allowed exposure to LDCs to become so
high may be the existence of official international support
for developing countries through such programs as the
IMP's adjustment assistance programs.21
In contrast, there is little evidence that direct guaran-
tees, whether explicit or implicit, were available for
bonded debt. If guarantees were to apply only to bank
loans, this would explain the willingness of bank lenders
to continue lending while bondholders became more
reluctant after the crisis.
A second way that the government could have sub-
sidized lending to LDCs is indirectly - through (under-
priced) guarantees of banks' liabilities. Of course, such
subsidies are not available to bondholders. This sort of
deposit insurance subsidy increases banks' willingness to
hold risky assets generally. Since lending to LDCs was
consideredriskierthan lending toindustrialcountries even
prior to the debt crisis, banks would havehad incentives to
increase their exposure to LDC borrowers, particularly as
the demand for external funds apparently increased
throughout the 1970s. This could explain why a very large
share of the private lending to LDCs even prior tothe crisis
took the form of bank loans as opposed to bonds.
Once the debt crisis erupted, the response of bank share
prices and of new bank lending to troubled LDCs would
have depended on the nature of the subsidy. Direct sub-
sidies in the form of loan guarantees likely would havehad
less impact on stock prices and lending behavior than
indirect subsidies. Specifically, with direct subsidies, one
would not expect bank share values nor secondary market
values of outstanding LDC loans to decline since the
guarantor would have been the one to bear the losses.
The actual decline in share values and secondary market
prices after the crisis suggests either that direct subsidies
werenot asignificantfactor inbanks' international lending
decisions, or that investors and bank managers were
Economic Review / Spring 1988unsure of the strength of such implicit subsidies. The fact
that banks tended to view IMF assistance and involvement
in the rescheduling of a troubled country's debt as a
prerequisite for providing new funds to that country may
be a reflection of this uncertainty. Alternatively, Sachs has
argued that bankshave been willing to continue lending as
a quidpro quo forIMF protectionwith respect to outstand-
ing obligations.22
Regardless of the significance of direct subsidies in
banks' lending decisions, indirect subsidies (that is, sub-
sidiesassociatedwith deposit insuranceprotection) almost
certainly played an important role. There is a large and
growing body of evidence on the so-called deposit insur-
ance problem which suggests that indirect subsidies exert
a strong influence on banks' domestic lending. Foreign
lending shouldbe no different in this regard. Moreover,the
declines in bank share prices and secondary market prices
forLDC loans areboth consistentwith this type of subsidy.
Unlike direct subsidies, in the event of default, bank
shareholders do bear the risk oflosswith indirect subsidies
even though insured depositors do not.
Also, banks' willingness tocontinuelending to troubled
LDCs after the crisis is consistent with the view that
indirect subsidies were a significant factor in lending
decisions. For example, one could argue, as Furlong and
Keeley (1987) have, that a lender's incentive to hold risky
assets increases the closer the lender is to insolvency.
Thus, the decline in the market value of banks' net worth
following the debt crisis probably provided banks with an
additional incentive to maintain their exposure to the
riskier LDCs.
Finally, the regulatory accounting treatment of
rescheduled and nonaccruing LDC debt also is consistent
with the existence of indirect subsidies. Regulators have
allowed banks to record most LDC loans at book value as
long as there is some "reasonable" prospect that the bank
will be repaid at least its principal investment. As a result,
banks have not had to record capital losses for LDC loans
even though the market value of LDC loans declined
precipitously following the 1982 crisis. By allowing this
sort of indirect subsidy through "capital forbearance,"
bank regulators may have provided some additional
inducements to continue lending. (Of course, regulators
haverequired banks to improve their book value capital-to-
assets ratios since then, so the forbearance may not have
been as great as it might have first appeared.)
In sum, subsidies of various sorts probably help to
explain why U.S. banks' exposure to developing countries
reached such a high level inthe 1970s. Once the debt crisis
erupted, uncertainty over how the regulators would
respond to the increased possibility of default probably
also helps to explain why bank share values subsequently
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
declined and why banks reduced their new lending to
troubled LDCs. Moreover, the apparent tendency for
banks to keep the riskiest debt may be consistent with this
view,particularly if the regulators' actions overtime could
be interpreted as providing assurances of willingness to
forbear.
However,the existenceof subsidiesdoes not necessarily
explain why seemingly only the nine largest banks could
take advantage of them, unless the subsidies were directed
at a group of banks considered, by both the regulators and
the market, as too large to be allowed to fail. Otherwise,
subsidies would have been perceived to extend to other
large banks as well, if not also to the smaller banks.
Assessment
The available evidence on lending to LDCs cannot
clearly distinguish among the three explanations: the
involuntary lending argument, the efficiency factor, and
the subsidy factor. More sophisticated tests might shed
some light and, in fact, workin progress by James suggests
that indirect deposit subsidies have had a lot to do with
LDC lending.
However, it is likely that all three influences have been
operating since they are not mutually exclusive and may
even be complementary. For example, part of the reason
that the governments of industrial countries may have
chosen to provide protection for bank loans to LDCs may
have been that, in the event of a crisis, bank lenders have a
relative advantage in monitoring the borrower and in
handling a problem loan workout. Moreover, multilateral
organizations like the IMF may have encouraged con-
tinued lending and helped to enforce fair-share rules
because the amount of funds provided otherwise would
have been inadequate. Thus, the three influences could
have been and probably were mutually reinforcing.
25v. Summary and Policy Implications
Mexico's announcementin August 1982 had a profound
impact on the market's assessment ofthe default proba-
bilities associated with lending to developing countries.
Specifically, default risk premia increased and the holders
ofexisting debtsuffered large market value capital losses.
As a result, lenders have become less willing to extend
new loans to the countries perceived as most risky. More-
over, the outstanding exposureofU.S. banks has declined
through actual write-offs, repayments, and, primarily,
through growth in capital accounts.
The decline in exposure to troubled LDCs, however, is
not very dramatic when compared to the declines in
exposure to more creditworthy international borrowers.
Likewise, the largestU.S. banksnow have alargershare of
troubled LDC exposure than when the debt crisis erupted.
This paper has posited a numberof possible explanations,
all of which imply that after 1982 investors developed a
decided preference for holding the obligations of troubled
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LDCs in the form of bank loans as opposed to bonds.
Previously cited work by James suggests that indirect
subsidies have played a significant role in keeping U.S.
banks' exposure to the riskiest developing countries high.
Consequently, bank regulators must continue to monitor
these exposures carefully and encouragebanksto continue
to raise capital to prevent further distortions in interna-
tional lending decisions.
At the same time, however, bank lending to troubled
LDCs also may be a reflection ofthe monitoring
capabilities banks have in working with problem debtors.
As a result, the true value of these loans on banks' books
may lie somewhere between their book values and their
values to nonbank investors on the secondary market.
Suchconsiderations are important to proposals that would
require banks either to mark their LDC loan portfolios to
market and/or to hold substantially more book capital.
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Non-OPEC Developing Countries, Nontroubled Debtors
Mauritius Antigua Mozambique
Nauru Burma Nepal
North Korea Cameroon Netherlands-Antilles
Pakistan Congo Papua New Guinea
PuertoRico Egypt Singapore
Solomon Islands Fiji South Korea
Sri Lanka Guinea Swaziland
Syria India Taiwan




Baker's List of 15 Largest LDCs with Debt Servicing Problems
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1. See Sachs (1987) for a more complete description of the
rescheduling arrangements.
2. Cited in Kyle and Sachs (1984).
3. In addition, the average (for all rated countries) country
risk rating published by Institutional Investor fell from 52.3 to
41.0 between 1980 and 1983.
4. There are a number of other studies on the impact of lDC
exposure on bank share prices. See, for example, Smirlock
and Kaufold (1987) and Cornell and Shapiro (1986).
5. The data on external funds raised in international markets
come from the OECD's Financial Statistics Monthly. All data
are reported inU.S.dollars and are converted on the basis of
the average spot rate for the month the bonds or loans were
reported. Forthis paper, we use year-end figures that reflect
the sum of all new lending, including bond financing over the
year. It should be noted, however, that these figures repre-
sent total funds raised, including rescnedulinqs and reti-
nancings, as opposed to net new funds raised.
6. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Mar-
kets, June/July 1987.
7. Rodney Mills, "Foreign lending by Banks: A Guide to
International and U.S. Statistics," Federal Reserve Bulletin,
October 1986.
8. Itshould be noted, however, that this increase in loan loss
reserves also is the result of anticipated loan losses arising
from banks' domestic loan portfolios at this time.
9. Data on U.S. banks' international loan exposure come
from the Federal ReserveBoard's Country Exposure Lending
Survey (CElS). This survey was first conducted in 1977 in
response to a perceived need for better data on the cross-
border claims of consolidated banking organizations
domiciled in the U.S. with foreign branches and majority-
owned foreign subsidiaries. The data are now collected on a
quarterly basis. US bank exposure to over one hundred
countries and a number of international organizations are
reported by type of borrower and time remaining to maturity,
with adjustments for loan guarantees that shift exposure
across countries.
CElS dataare reported forthree subsets of banks: thenine
money center banks, the next 14 largest banks, and the
remaining banks with at least $30 million in consolidated
claims on non-U.S. residents and that have at least one
foreign branch or foreign subsidiary (about 160 in number).
The major drawbacks of these data are that they do not
cover the claims held by all U.S. banks and the country-by-
country breakdown only covers exposures that exceed
three-fourths of one percent of a reporting bank's capital.
Also, CElS data do not cover local-currency-denominated
claims.
28
10. Reported in Sachs (1987), cited above.
11. Krugman (1985) and Sachs (1984) have developed
models that show once a sovereign borrower has run into
debt problems, it may be in the interests of all the lenders
involved to reschedule the outstanding obligation and
extend additional funds to reduce the borrower's near-term
debt burden and enhance long-term repayment prospects.
However. because there is a public good aspect to new
lending i~ that the value of any given lender's outstanding
exposure will be enhanced whether or notthat lender partici-
pates in providing new funds, the lenders with the smallest
exposures will have an incentive to "free ride" on the new
lending of the others.
12. The Spearman Rank Test showed that correlation
between the Institutional Investor rating and the loan dis-
count for a given country was 0.843, at a significance level of
0.0001.
13. OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly.
14. There may be other factors, as well. For example, Gut-
tentag and Herring (1985) argue that bank lending to
developing countries can be explained by a concept drawn
from current research in cognitive psychology called "disas-
termyopia." However, because this view hasnotgained wide
acceptance inthe literature, it is not addressed Inthis article.
15. Berlin and loeys (1986), James (forthcoming) and
implicit in Folkerts-landau (1985).
16. These covenants typically require the borrower to meet
certain readily observed conditions which, presumably, are
good indicators of the borrower's true net worth. These
conditions include among other things, restrictions on the
types of assets the borrower may invest in, the maintenance
of certain financial ratios, and the maintenance of a minimum
level of capital adequacy. Violations of these covenants
imply that the borrower is close to insolvency, giving bond-
holders the right to accelerate the maturity of their claim even
to the point of forcing liquidation of the borrower's assets in
bankruptcy.
17. Forexample, the growth inthe commercial paper market
largely is due to the ability of larger, well-established bor-
rowers to raise funds directly at a lower cost than through
bank loans.
18. See Niehans (1985) and Glick (1986).
19. Sachs (1987), p. 21.
20. Folkerts-landau (1985), p. 324.
21. Guttentag and Herring (1985), p. 136.
22. Sachs (1987), p. 21.
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